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If you don’t succeed, should you try again? 
The role of entrepreneurial experience in venture survival 
Sandra Gottschalk*, Francis J. Greene**, Daniel Höwer***, and Bettina Müller**** 
 
Abstract 
There remains considerable scholarly debate about the role that prior entrepreneurial experi-
ence plays in new venture survival.  Drawing on entrepreneurial learning theories, we use 
panel data on 8,400 new ventures to investigate the impact of four different types of prior en-
trepreneurial experience (portfolio, serial, failure (bankruptcy/voluntary dissolution) and a 
mix of success (portfolio/serial) and failure (prior bankruptcy/dissolution) on venture survival 
outcomes.  We find that previously failed entrepreneurs are less likely to survive and, in com-
mon with entrepreneurs with mixed prior experiences, are more likely to experience bank-
ruptcy.  We find that portfolio and serial experience is unrelated to survival or avoiding bank-
ruptcy.  Conclusions for entrepreneurship scholars, entrepreneurs and stakeholders are dis-
cussed. 
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1 Introduction 
A growing body of literature has addressed the role that prior entrepreneurial experience 
plays in influencing subsequent entrepreneurial performance (Stuart and Abetti, 1990; 
Westhead and Wright, 1998; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2006).  The basic assumption 
is that those entrepreneurs with prior entrepreneurial experience are more likely to have posi-
tive entrepreneurial outcomes (Cope, 2011; Minniti and Bygrave, 2001) than novice entrepre-
neurs (individuals with no prior business founding experience and who currently own a busi-
ness) (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Flores, 2010).  Recent evidence has also begun to 
emerge which suggests that the outcomes of prior entrepreneurial experience is important in 
explaining the subsequent entrepreneurial endeavors of entrepreneurs.  Gompers, Lerner, 
Scharfstein and Kovner (2010) – albeit just for venture capital backed firms - show that previ-
ously successful entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful than novice entrepreneurs in 
their new focal venture.  This is because previously successful entrepreneurs are more likely 
to attract external funding and use their prior experience to develop a successful market entry 
strategy.  In other words, Gompers et al (2010) argue that success breeds success.   
What, however, is less clear is if failure breeds success.  If entrepreneurs experience 
failure, should they try again?  Entrepreneurial learning theorists suggest that failure experi-
ence has a profound and positive impact on subsequent venture performance (Cope, 2011).  
Corbett (2005, 2007) argues that entrepreneurs learn through experience and improvisation, 
suggesting that prior failure experience prompts the development of experiential heuristics 
which can be beneficial to the sustainability of new ventures.  Smilor (1997) states that entre-
preneurs “learn from what works and, more importantly, from what doesn’t work” (p.344) 
and further studies identify that business owners credit their future success to prior failures 
(Cardon and McGrath, 1999; Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Sitkin, 1992).  Nonetheless, find-
ings such as these are typically based on small-scale qualitative studies.  Quantitative evi-
dence contradicts the assertion that failure leads to subsequent venture survival (Frankish, 
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Roberts, Coad, Spears and Storey, 2012; Neilsen and Sarasvathy, 2011; Ucbasaran et al, 
2006). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of prior entrepreneurial experience on 
venture survival outcomes.  For the first time – as far as we are aware - we examine four types 
of prior entrepreneurial experience.  The first two we consider as ‘successful’ prior entrepre-
neurial experience: portfolio (here defined as entrepreneurs concurrently running at least one 
venture besides the focal venture) and serial entrepreneurs (defined as entrepreneurs that prior 
to the focal venture ran a venture and either sold their business or passed it on to a successor).  
We distinguish between these two types of successful entrepreneurial experience because we 
conjecture that there are discernible survival differences between these two groups.  We argue 
that, relative to novice entrepreneurs, portfolio entrepreneurs are more likely to have better 
survival outcomes than serial entrepreneurs, because they have greater levels of ‘content do-
main’ experience (Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2013).  Our third group is those that have 
‘failed’ in a prior venture.  We define these as entrepreneurs that prior to the focal venture ran 
a venture that went bankrupt or was voluntarily dissolved.  We argue that these are more like-
ly to have positive survival outcomes than novice entrepreneurs because of they derive learn-
ing benefits from their prior experience of failure.  Finally, based upon the above definitions, 
we examine entrepreneurs with a ‘mixed’ experience of both ‘success’ and ‘failure’, again 
arguing that these entrepreneurs are more likely to survive than novice entrepreneurs.  Our 
aim in distinguishing these four types of entrepreneurial experience is to respond to calls 
(Ucsbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett and Lyon, 2012; Neilsen and Sarasvathy, 2011) for a more 
nuanced approach to different forms of entrepreneurial experience.   
We examine two types of venture survival outcome.  First, we consider if the focal ven-
ture survives.  Second, we disaggregate this standard binary approach by considering if the 
non-surviving focal venture is either voluntarily dissolved or goes bankrupt.  We focus on 
these outcomes because prior research has identified the need for a richer conceptualization of 
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exit events (Wennberg and DeTienne, forthcoming; Coad, 2013; Wennberg, Wiklund, 
DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010).  We examine voluntary dissolution because it has been used to 
better understand how entrepreneurs realize that the venture has fallen short of the goals they 
set for their venture (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, 1997; McGrath, 1999; Ucbasaran et al, 
2013).  We also focus on bankruptcy because it is an unambiguous indication of poor eco-
nomic performance (Carter and van Auken, 2006).  In overall terms, we ask two central re-
search questions.  First, do these different forms of entrepreneurial experience impact on the 
survival of the new focal venture?  Second, what impact do these different forms of entrepre-
neurial experience have on the likelihood of voluntary dissolution or bankruptcy in the new 
focal venture?  
These are important research questions for three reasons.  First, relative to our under-
standing of start-up or growth, venture failure generally remains an under-researched area 
(Blackburn and Kovalainen, 2009; DeTienne, 2010; Wennberg et al, 2010).  This is despite 
failure being a common outcome for new and small ventures (Knaup and Piazza, 2007).   
Second, for researchers interested in entrepreneurial learning there remain open ques-
tions about the pathways by which prior entrepreneurial experience influences subsequent 
venture survival.  In specific, some researchers identify that entrepreneurial experience is a 
valuable form of experiential learning that can be potentially successfully transferred to a new 
venture (Politis, 2005; Shepherd, 2003; Autio and Pathak, 2010).  In contrast, a range of stud-
ies have identified reasons why experience may be a poor guide to future venture survival.  
Frankish et al (2012) argue that, because uncertainty is endemic in entrepreneurial settings no 
two business situations are identical, implying that experience has limited efficacy for the 
entrepreneur in their new focal venture.  Learning theorists (e.g. Kahneman et al, 1982; March 
2010) also identify that transferring knowledge gained from prior experiences is difficult in 
complex situations and that generalizing from past experiences can lead to unfavorable out-
comes (Mazur, 1994).  Entrepreneurs are also prone to over-optimism (De Meza, 2002; Fraser 
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and Greene, 2006) and often attribute failure to others rather than themselves (Diwas, Staats, 
and Gino, 2013).  Parker  (2006) shows further  entrepreneurs typically make few adjustments 
to their behaviour in the face of prior evidence whilst Eesley and Roberts (2012) Chen (2013), 
Rocha, Carneiro and Varum (2013) all argue that entrepreneurial talent rather than entrepre-
neurial experience is more likely to determine venture outcomes.  Overall, there is a need for 
research to explore if, indeed, prior entrepreneurial experience is efficacious, particularly to 
support the formation of guidance to entrepreneurs.   
Finally, although the positive evidence on the efficacy of prior entrepreneurial failure as 
a precursor to entrepreneurial success remains limited (Ucbasaran et al, 2013), Lee, Peng and 
Barney (2007) and Lee, Yamakawa, Peng and Barney (2011) have advocated the relaxation of 
bankruptcy laws.  Policy makers have also adopted policies to relax bankruptcy laws in the 
belief that failure breeds success.  For example, the European Commission (2003) state that 
“failed entrepreneurs learn from their mistakes and perform better in their next business” 
(p.22).  This is despite as Ucbasaran et al (2013) indicate that “unfortunately, there is an ab-
sence of research testing this proposition, which is not surprising given the need for a large 
longitudinal panel database containing a large number of entrepreneurs” (p. 187).  Testing the 
value of different forms of entrepreneurial experience on venture survival outcomes can po-
tentially guide policy makers, practitioners and scholars in this important area.   
Our empirical approach is to use the longitudinal KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel data on 
8,400 new German ventures founded between 2005 and 2011 and to estimate two duration 
models (survival time and competing risks) that determine the relationship between prior en-
trepreneurial experience and the survival outcomes of the focal venture.  In the next section, 
we develop our hypotheses.  Section 3 delineates our panel data and our survival time models.  
In Section 4 we present our results before Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our find-
ings and the implications they have for entrepreneurship scholars, entrepreneurs and stake-
holders. 
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2 Hypotheses 
In this section, we develop hypotheses consistent with theories of entrepreneurial learn-
ing that argue that all types of prior entrepreneurial experience leads to better venture survival 
outcomes.  While doing this, we recognize that the efficacy of prior entrepreneurial experi-
ence to venture survival outcomes is yet to be shown (Ucbasaran et al, 2013), and that entre-
preneurial experience brings both assets and liabilities (Ucbasaran et al, 2006). 
 
2.1. Prior entrepreneurial success experience 
Entrepreneurial learning theorists argue that prior entrepreneurial success potentially 
provides a number of assets to entrepreneurs in their new focal venture.  Central to entrepre-
neurial processes is the identification and exploitation of business opportunities (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000).  For both portfolio and serial entrepreneurs, experience may furnish 
entrepreneurs with the ability to better foresee and evaluate potential profit opportunities 
(Kirzner, 1973).  Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson (2012) found that experienced entrepre-
neurs were more likely and better able than novice entrepreneurs to identify market opportuni-
ties.  In short, experienced entrepreneurs were better able to ‘connect the dots’ (Baron and 
Ensley, 2006) than inexperienced entrepreneurs because they were able to identify opportuni-
ties earlier (Gaglio and Katz, 2001) and more frequently (Gruber et al, 2012).  Equally, to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities, entrepreneurs have to understand their market, the com-
petition they face and provide the service customer’s need.  These issues are particularly acute 
in the early stages of a new venture where the impetus is to overcome the ‘liability of new-
ness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965).  Successful prior entrepreneurial experience may obviate these 
barriers to business development by increasing comprehension of the tasks required (Dimov, 
2010), thereby shortening the time and resources required to meet important developmental 
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milestones (e.g. making sales, employing staff) faced by the new venture (Capelleras and 
Greene, 2008; Forbes, 2005).   
Learning by doing experiences (Thompson, 2009) are also potentially invaluable for the 
resource management of external stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, debt and equity fi-
nanciers) (Huovinen and Tihula, 2008).  A successful track record potentially builds credibil-
ity; develops partnerships with customers and suppliers (Ostgaard and Birley, 1994); eases the 
availability of trade credit finance; and increases the likelihood of accessing of debt and equi-
ty finance (Gompers et al, 2010).  In sum, relative to novice entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs with 
prior successful experience have lower start-up costs and have a higher potential to raise start-
up capital.  This is likely to increase venture survival (Plehn-Dujowich, 2010). 
Equally, although the successful management of ventures involves managing upsides 
(i.e. venture survival), it also involves managing downside risks (avoiding bankruptcy).  Bates 
(2005) argues that very many new ventures are, in fact, experiments whereby entrepreneurs 
pay to ‘take a look’ at an entrepreneurial opportunity.  Testing a new market opportunity inev-
itably involves deciding whether to ‘stay or quit’ (Jovanovic, 1982).  Baron and Ensley (2006) 
also argue that experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to recognize ‘danger’ than novice 
entrepreneurs because they focused more on the financial viability of an opportunity rather 
than its novelty or uniqueness.  In general, we hypothesize that the identification, exploitation 
and resource advantages gained from prior successful entrepreneurial experience are related to 
higher survival chances and a lower probability of experiencing bankruptcy.  We also suggest 
that there may be differences between portfolio and serial entrepreneurs.  Whilst prior experi-
ence of success may apply to both portfolio and serial entrepreneurs, we argue that portfolio 
entrepreneurs are more likely to have greater levels of task specific knowledge derived from a 
wider and potentially richer experience of different entrepreneurial contexts.  Hence, we argue 
that portfolio entrepreneurs are more likely to have greater experience of conducting and re-
peating salient venture activities such as identifying opportunities, mobilizing resources and 
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developing exploitation strategies.  In short, successful portfolio entrepreneurs have greater 
levels of expert entrepreneurial knowledge.  Overall, we hypothesize that, relative to novice 
entrepreneurs, that success breeds success, particularly for portfolio entrepreneurs. 
 
H1a: Venture survival is more likely for portfolio than novice entrepreneurs; 
H1b: Portfolio entrepreneurs are less likely than novice entrepreneurs to experience 
bankruptcy; 
H2a: Venture survival is more likely for serial than novice entrepreneurs; 
H2b: Serial entrepreneurs are less likely than novice entrepreneurs to experience bank-
ruptcy 
 
 
2.2. Prior entrepreneurial failure experience 
Entrepreneurial learning theorists have argued that the experience of business failure 
can also provide a conduit to subsequent business success.  Unlike the previously successful 
entrepreneurs who may be complacent, myopic or fail to experiment sufficiently in their new 
venture (Sitkin, 1992), entrepreneurial failure is seen as an exemplar of “…discontinuous ex-
periences during the entrepreneurial process [which] can stimulate distinctive forms of higher-
level learning that prove fundamental to the entrepreneur...” (Cope 2011: 2).  This is because 
although prior success can increase the entrepreneurs’ confidence in their pre-existing entre-
preneurial routines, failure potentially forces the entrepreneur to re-evaluate what is required 
to be a successful entrepreneur (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Politis, 2005).  Following on 
from social learning theory (Bandura, 1997) which emphasises enactive mastery (learning by 
doing) and vicarious learning (Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes and Hitt, 2009), McGrath (1999) 
has argued that prior failure promotes better opportunity recognition by increasing the varia-
bility of search strategies for new opportunities.  It also encourages failed entrepreneurs to 
understand why their resource and exploitation strategies did not work and what they have to 
do in a new venture if they are to survive (Politis and Gabrielson, 2009). 
However, the experience of prior failure may have persistent consequences on the per-
formance of any new venture (Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2003).  Failed entrepreneurs 
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may have fewer resources to call upon in their new venture and find it difficult to leverage the 
necessary support from external stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, debt and equity fi-
nanciers) to sustain the new venture.  So, although Cope, Cave and Eccles (2004) found that 
equity financiers were agnostic about the importance of prior failure, the prevailing sense is 
that failure still carries a stigma (Kirkwood, 2007; Vaillant and Lafuente, 2007) and that sur-
vival may be conditional on accessing financial resources. 
It may also be the case that previously failed entrepreneurs are again more likely to ex-
perience subsequent bankruptcy.  There are a number of reasons for this.  Learning is difficult 
(Levinthal and March, 1993), particularly given the heterogeneity and idiosyncratic nature of 
new opportunities.  How experienced entrepreneurs learn may also have less to do with their 
prior experiences of failure or success, but more with their underlying learning ability (Parker, 
2012).  Entrepreneurs are also prone to over-optimism (de Meza, 2002) and over-confidence 
(Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006) in how they allocate, use and attain resources.  This 
can lead them to deprive their new venture of resources with the net result that it increases the 
likelihood that they will again go bankrupt.  Equally, there is evidence from both entrepre-
neurial (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003) and corporate (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005; Cannon 
and Edmondson, 2005) settings which emphasizes that failure does not necessarily lead to 
changes in behaviour.  Attribution theory, in particular, argues that experience of failure do 
not necessarily lead to subsequent learning.  Rather than seeing failure as being due to internal 
factors (e.g. their ability or efforts), individuals may ascribe failure to external situational fac-
tors that are beyond their control.  Weiner (1974) also argues that this is likely because indi-
viduals often wish to develop positive personal images.  Applied to entrepreneurial situations 
where self-efficacy and over-optimism are potentially important, ‘failed’ entrepreneurs may 
not learn from their own failures.  In essence, “the mere fact of failing did not result in learn-
ing effects” (Neilsen and Sarasvathy, 2011: 4).   
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Whilst we recognize the importance of venture finance issues and that learning from 
failure is potentially difficult, our conjecture is that those with prior failure experience are first 
more likely to survive than novice entrepreneurs.  This is in response to largely qualitative 
evidence which suggests that failure is likely to breed subsequent success because it forces the 
previous failed entrepreneur to evaluate how they identify, exploit and manage entrepreneuri-
al opportunities in their new venture.  In short, the failure experience changes the way in 
which these entrepreneurs process information.  Instead, of being comfortable with refining 
previous actions, failure may lead the entrepreneur to search out information in ways that rep-
resent a step change from previous activities.  Second, we propose that previously failed en-
trepreneurs are relative to novice entrepreneurs less likely to experience bankruptcy.  Again, 
this argument draws upon theoretical considerations and qualitative empirical evidence which, 
in the main, suggests that prior experience - particularly of bankruptcy - is so traumatic that in 
the new focal ventures these entrepreneurs seek to avoid repeating the experience.  Hence:  
H3a: Venture survival is likely to be higher amongst those with prior failure experi-
ence than amongst novice entrepreneurs; 
H3b: Entrepreneurs who previously failed are less likely than novice entrepreneurs to 
experience bankruptcy. 
 
 
2.3. The mix of prior entrepreneurial success and failure 
One issue that has not, as far as we are aware, been explored in prior entrepreneurship 
research is the impact of the mix of failed and successful entrepreneurship on venture surviv-
al.  Diwas et al (2013), argue that the mix of prior success and failure can have positive learn-
ing benefits for cardiac surgeons.  They show that surgeons are more likely to learn from a 
mix of their own successes and the failure of other surgeons.  Whilst we are unable to assess 
the impact of failure by other entrepreneurs on our entrepreneurs we argue that the mix of 
prior success and failure is potentially important in supporting the survival of the focal ven-
ture.  This is for two reasons.  First, as we have already argued, prior success potentially con-
fers reputational and legitimation advantages which may help support the development of the 
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new venture.  External resource providers such as debt and equity suppliers may recognize 
these successes and see advantages in supporting the venture.  Similarly, prior success may 
indicate that the entrepreneur has – relative to a novice entrepreneur – the entrepreneurial, 
managerial and technical ability to identify, exploit and manage opportunities.   
Second, the experience of failure which is often traumatic (Cope, 2011) may reduce the 
myopia, complacency and hubris associated with success, ensuring that in the new venture the 
entrepreneur devotes sufficient energy and resources to successfully prosecute the business 
idea (Coelho and McClure, 2005).  Hessels, Grilo, Thurik and van der Zwan (2011) also argue 
that prior failure deepens the human capital stock of the individual and can spur future venture 
creation.  Moreover, whilst failure may make external stakeholders more circumspect about 
supporting the focal venture, Cope et al (2004) argue that external stakeholders may also rec-
ognise that the entrepreneur is ‘battle-hardened’, particularly as there is a widespread under-
standing that failure is integral to entrepreneurial dynamics (Houvinen and Tihula, 2008).   
Similar to earlier, we also argue that compared to novice entrepreneurs, those with 
mixed entrepreneurship experience are less likely to experience bankruptcy.  Whilst there is 
contrary evidence that failure experience may be symptomatic of, for example, hubris, we 
argue that these experienced entrepreneurs are better able to evaluate market opportunities 
and avoid bankruptcy.  Overall, we argue that entrepreneurs with experience of success and 
failure are more likely to survive and less likely to go bankrupt than novice entrepreneurs be-
cause they have specific knowledge of both success and failure.  
 
H4a: Venture survival is likely to be higher amongst those with prior failure/success 
experience than amongst novice entrepreneurs; 
H4b: Entrepreneurs with mixed entrepreneurial experience are less likely than novice 
entrepreneurs to experience bankruptcy 
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3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
We use data from the first five survey waves (2008-2012) of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up 
Panel (KfW/ZEW-Gründungspanel).  This is a unique panel data set on newly founded ven-
tures in Germany.  The panel was established in 2008 by the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW), KfW Bankengruppe (Germany’s largest state owned promotional bank) and 
Creditreform (Germany’s largest credit rating agency).  These data are collected using com-
puter-aided telephone interviews and have a target of approximately 6,000 interviews per an-
num.  In overall terms, the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel is the most comprehensive database of 
German new ventures. 
The sampling frame of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel is the Mannheim Enterprise Panel 
(MUP).  The MUP covers almost all firms in Germany and is built from the database of 
Creditreform (Almus, Engel and Prantl, 2000).  Besides information on venture stocks, the 
MUP also includes information on start-ups, bankruptcies and voluntary closures.  These data 
are updated annually.  The statistical unit of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel is the legally inde-
pendent venture.  Merger activities and subsidiary businesses are excluded from the survey.  
The sample is stratified according to three criteria: (i) year of firm formation, (ii) industry, and 
(iii) whether or not the firm has received financial support by KfW.  Each year, a random 
sample of new ventures is drawn from the MUP which have been founded during the three 
years prior to the year of the survey.  Selected ventures are subsequently followed over suc-
cessive panel waves until they are eight years old. 
The first five waves of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel contain information on entrepre-
neurial characteristics (e.g. educational background, gender, prior employment status, mana-
gerial and leadership experience, prior entrepreneurial experience), venture finance character-
istics (e.g. amount of investments and current costs, financing sources and structure), and ven-
ture characteristics (e.g. start-up size, number of employees) on 13,000 new ventures.  Infor-
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mation on venture survival outcomes is derived from the MUP.  In this paper, we restrict our 
sample to ventures founded by a single founder because the data does not allow us to specifi-
cally identify which of the founders has prior entrepreneurial experience in team-based new 
ventures.  In order to avoid these confounding effects, we restricted our sample to solo entre-
preneurial ventures.  This gives us a sample of 8,400 new ventures which is 70% of the total 
sample1.  
 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
 We use two dependent variables.  First, in common with a range of other studies (see 
reviews by Parker, 2009; Storey and Greene, 2010), we measure survival if a venture has sur-
vived until year j-1, where j is the survey year and j-1 is the reporting year.  In total, as Table 
1 shows, the survival rate is 89%.  Second, we differentiate the non-surviving ventures be-
tween those that go bankrupt (4%) and those that close voluntarily (7%).  
 
3.2.2. Predictor Covariates: Prior experience of failure and success 
 We use four measures of prior entrepreneurial experience.  Prior experience of suc-
cessful entrepreneurship is measured in two ways: PORTFOLIO (1=currently running more 
than one venture besides the focal venture, 0=otherwise); and SERIAL (1=previously 
sold/transferred a venture; 0=otherwise).  Failed entrepreneurs (FAILURE) are those entre-
preneurs who had previously run a venture that went bankrupt or was voluntary dissolved 
(0=otherwise).  The final measure of prior entrepreneurial experience includes entrepreneurs 
who have prior experience of both failure and success (MIX_EXP).  Table 1 shows that 11% 
of all entrepreneurs are failed entrepreneurs, 9% are portfolio, 6% are serial entrepreneurs, 
                                                     
1 This is representative of German new ventures since around 75% of the ventures are set up by solo entrepre-
neurs. 
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and 1% have ‘mixed’ experiences. In sum, more than a quarter of the new ventures are found-
ed by entrepreneurs with prior entrepreneurial experience. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
Table 1 also details a range of entrepreneur, venture, sectoral and vintage controls that 
are commonly associated with survival.  In terms of entrepreneurial characteristics, Lin, Picot 
and Compton (2000) and Bates (1995) found that the better educated (measured by 
1=DEGREE, 0=otherwise and higher vocational qualifications (1=MASTERCRAFT, 
0=otherwise)); those with prior industrial (log of number of years) (van Praag, 2003) or with 
managerial experience (1=MANAGE_EXP, 0=otherwise) (Taylor, 1999), are more likely to 
survive.  There is also clear evidence that survival often follows an inverted U-shaped pattern 
with respect to the age of the entrepreneur, with ventures run by younger and older aged indi-
viduals less likely to survive (Bates, 1995; van Praag, 2003) (log of entrepreneur’s age and 
age squared (AGE and AGE2)).  Women (1=FEMALE, 0=otherwise) are also less likely to 
experience survival (Honjo, 2000).  Finally, Shane, Locke, Collins (2003) identify that ven-
ture survival also depends on entrepreneurial motivations.  We distinguish between those en-
trepreneurs who created their venture in response to the identification of a market gap 
(1=OPPORTUNITY, 0=otherwise), because of the absence of alternative opportunities, 
(1=NECESSITY, 0=otherwise) or to achieve independence (1=INDEPENDENCE, 
0=otherwise (base category)).  Table 1 shows that 14% of venture founders are female, that 
the average age is 41 years, and that 31% and 29% have a degree or a higher vocational quali-
fication, respectively.  Mean years of industrial experience is 15 years with 37% having prior 
managerial experience.  27% are motivated by opportunity whilst a further 19% set the ven-
ture up out of necessity. 
In terms of venture characteristics, evidence suggests that limited companies (1=LTD, 
0=otherwise), those that conduct research and development (R&D=1, 0=otherwise) and big-
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ger ventures are more likely to survive (SIZE, SIZE2).  So, too, are better capitalized ventures 
(logarithm of the total amount of investments in the reporting year (INV))2; those which have 
access to external finance from the government (1=PUBLIC, 0=otherwise) or from external 
investors (share of external financing (EXTERNAL)).  Also important is the availability of 
internal financing through retained earnings (share of cash flow on total financing (RE-
TAINED)), and if the venture experienced financial problems (1=FIN_PROBLEMS, 
0=otherwise).  Prior studies (Geroski, 1995; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Parker, 2009; 
Geroski, Mata and Portugal, 2010 and Storey and Greene, 2010) show that these factors influ-
ence venture survival).  Table 1 shows that the average venture size is 3.4 employees (includ-
ing the founder) with a quarter (27%) being a limited company and 18% conducting R&D.  
Table 1 also shows that 16% of founders experienced financial problems, that 34% used gov-
ernment support; that, on average, 66% of ventures used retained earnings to fund their in-
vestments; 13% of outside financing stemmed from external sources (banks, funding or pri-
vate investors); and that ventures invested €35,000 annually.  Finally, we include a range of 
sectoral dummies: new technology based manufacturing (divided into ‘cutting edge technolo-
gy’ (CET) (base category) and ‘high technology’ (HT)); non-high-tech manufacturing (OTH-
ER_MANU); high-tech services (NTB_SERVICES, SOFTWARE), CONSTRUCTION, 
knowledge-intensive services (KNOW_SERVICES), and consumer related services (CON-
SUME_SERVICES, OTHER_SERVICES and RETAIL) and controls for the start-up year in 
the estimations.  The most common sectors are new technology based services (20%), retail 
(16%), consumer services (13%) and construction (13%) whilst the most common years of 
founding are 2006 and 2007. 
 
                                                     
2 We replace INV=log(0.0001) if investments are zero, otherwise we would lose the observation of the venture in 
the reporting year. We add a control variable indicating that investments are zero for that observation (INV 
DUM). 
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3.3 Estimation approach 
To estimate survival time of the ventures we use two duration models. The first is a sin-
gle risk model where we only account for the fact whether a firm has survived or not.  Whilst 
survival time is continuous, we only observe if the venture still exists at the end of the year, 
i.e. spell lengths are only observed in intervals. We therefore estimate a model for interval 
censored data.  The relevant hazard rate is the probability of exit during year ݆ given survival 
up to year ݆ − 1 
ℎ௝(ܺ) = ܲ(݆ − 1 < ܶ ≤ ݆|ܶ > ݆ − 1, ܺ), 
where j denotes the half-open interval (ݕ݁ܽݎ௝ିଵ; ݕ݁ܽݎ௝].  The dependent variable contains the 
information whether or not venture ݅ survived year ݆  
௜ܵ௝ = ൜1	if	firm	i	survives	year	j																0	if	firm	i	does	not	survive	year	j	. 
Duration models based on this type of data can be estimated by applying methods for 
standard binary outcome models (Sueyoshi, 1995; and Jenkins, 2005).  As functional form for 
the hazard rate we use a complementary log-log specification3 and allow for both time-
invariant and time-variant covariates. The hazard rate can then be expressed as 
logൣ− log(1 − ℎ௜௝)൧ = ߚ଴ + ߚ′ଵ ௜ܺ + ߚ′ଶܼ௜௝ + ݑ௜, 
where ܺᇱ is a matrix of time-invariant explanatory variables and ܼ௧ᇱ is a matrix of time-variant 
explanatory variables and ݑ௜ is the random intercept of firm ݅.  In order to allow the hazard 
rate to vary with survival time (duration dependence), year dummies are added to the list of 
regressors. 
To account for venture heterogeneity not captured by the observed variables, the com-
plementary log-log model is estimated with random effects so that for binary variables the 
unobservable firm effect ݑ௜	is sampled along with the dependent variable and observable in-
                                                     
3 In principle, any continuous distribution function can be used but Greene (2000: 815) shows that the results of 
binary choice models are not very sensitive to the functional form of the distribution functions. 
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dependent variables and it is removed by integrating it out (Wooldridge, 2002: 482).  Here, 
the distribution of ݑ௜ is assumed to be ܰ~(0, ߪ௨	).   
Our second duration model is a competing risk model in which we assess whether the 
different types of entrepreneurial experience have different effects on the two types of closure 
(voluntary dissolution and bankruptcy).  Because of the way survival time is reported in our 
data we again use a model for interval censored data.  The dependent variable is  
௜ܵ௝ = ቐ
0	if	firm	i	survives	year	j																			
1	if	firm	i		voluntarily	exits	in	year	j
2	if	firm	i	goes	bankrupt	in	year	j	
	. 
It can be shown that a competing risk model with interval censored data can be esti-
mated by applying a standard multinomial logit model (Allison, 1982: Jenkins, 2005).  The 
destination specific hazard for the two exit states in this case are assumed to be 
ℎ௩ௗ =
exp	(ߚ′௩ௗܺ)
1 + exp൫ߚᇱ௩ௗܺ൯ + exp	(ߚ′௕ܺ)
 
and  
ℎ௕ =
exp	(ߚ′௕ܺ)
1 + exp൫ߚᇱ௩ௗܺ൯ + exp	(ߚ′௕ܺ)
, 
where ݒ݀	= voluntary dissolution and ܾ = bankruptcy.  Duration dependence is accounted for 
by including year dummies in the list of regressors as above. 
 
4 Results 
Our results are organised into six tables.  Table 1 shows summary statistics and pre-
sents the results of simple T-tests that – against a range of entrepreneurial and venture charac-
teristics - compare our four types of prior entrepreneurial experience with novice entrepre-
neurs.  Table 2 shows correlation coefficients.  These are generally modest and we detected 
no signs of collinearity which might impact on our subsequent econometric analysis.  
In Table 3, we present two models.  The first model presents the base model results for 
our survival time model (non/survival).  The second model responds to Eesley and Roberts 
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(2012) and Toft-Kehler et al (2013) who showed that industrial experience, education and 
financial capital can impact on the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and sur-
vival.  Model 2 in Table 3 examines if these factors influence the relationship between entre-
preneurial experience and survival outcomes.  Table 4 ccomplements these results by, first, 
restricting the sample to prior failed entrepreneurs and, second, to high-technology ventures in 
order to find out whether the effects of prior entrepreneurial experience is different for entre-
preneurs who already failed once and for high-tech firms.  Table 5 presents the results of the 
competing risk model which differentiates between voluntary dissolution and bankruptcy out-
comes in the focal venture both in terms of the base model (Model 1) and in terms of the in-
fluence of financial capital, industrial experience and education (Model 2).  Finally, Table 6 
show the results of our competing risk models for the restricted samples (prior failed entre-
preneurs and high-tech ventures). 
The T-test results in Table 1 identify interesting differences between novice and our 
four groups of experienced entrepreneurs.  Relative to novices, experienced entrepreneurs are 
more likely to be highly educated (DEGREE), be older, have greater industry experience, are 
more likely to set up as a limited company, be located in high-tech sectors, and conduct R&D.  
They are also more likely to be OPPORTUNITY rather than NECESSITY entrepreneurs.  
Furthermore, PORTFOLIO and SERIAL entrepreneurs have on average more employees and 
have higher yearly investments than novice entrepreneurs. In contrast, experienced entrepre-
neurs are less likely – relative to novice entrepreneurs – to be women, to have managerial 
experience, be in construction, and receive public funding for their venture.  One final differ-
ence between novice and experienced entrepreneurs is that novice entrepreneurs are less like-
ly to experience financial problems.  These are differences that we return to after we have 
presented our multivariate results. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
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Table 3 presents the results of the binary survival duration model (non/survival).  In 
terms of our specific hypotheses, Table 3 shows that there is no evidence that portfolios or 
serials are more likely to survive.  We, therefore, reject H1a and H2a.  We also find no evi-
dence to support H4a that ‘mixed’ entrepreneurs are more likely to survive than novices.  
However, Table 3 shows that those with prior experience of entrepreneurial failure are less 
likely to survive.  We reject H3a.  Model 2 in Table 3 also shows that financial capital and 
industrial experience are insignificant.  The only significant interaction term is if failed entre-
preneurs have a degree, indicating that venture survival is more likely amongst failures with a 
higher degree.  
With respect to the control variables, there is evidence of an inverted U-shaped pattern 
effect for entrepreneurial age; and that those with master craft level qualifications and sectoral 
experience are more likely to survive.  Necessity entrepreneurs are less likely to survive.  The 
other controls that impact on survival in Table 3 are financial factors.  Those ventures that 
have greater levels of investment, received public financial support and use greater shares of 
inside financing are all more likely to survive.  Those with financial problems are less likely 
to survive.   
Table 3 about here 
In order to learn more about different subgroups of new ventures we restrict the sam-
ple in two ways.  First, given that failed entrepreneurs are significantly less likely to survive, 
we investigate in Model 1, Table 4 which characteristics of the entrepreneur and its venture 
are associated with closing again.  The results show an inverted U-shaped age effect and that 
those with prior managerial experience are less likely to survive.  Women are also less likely 
to survive.  So, too, are those experiencing financial problems.  Perhaps the most interesting 
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result in Table 4 is that OPPORTUNITY based entrepreneurs are less likely to survive4.  Sec-
ond, because our firms include a number of high-tech ventures, we restricted the sample to 
high-tech ventures to see if there are evident differences between all and high-tech ventures.  
Following on from the NACE (revision 1) classification, high-tech ventures are defined in 
terms of high-tech manufacturing (NTB_MANU: CET and HT), knowledge intensive services 
(NTB_SERVICES) and SOFTWARE sectors.  Model 2 in Table 4 shows that none of the key 
prior entrepreneurship experience variables are significant, either positively or negatively.  
Hence, although FAILURE remains negative (as does MIX_EXP), it is no longer significant.  
Similarly, although PORTFOLIO and SERIAL are positive, these results are insignificant.  
Overall, there is little in Table 5 to suggest that prior entrepreneurial experience promotes 
venture survival even amongst high-tech ventures.   
Table 4  
Table 5 shows our results from the competing risks model.  In terms of voluntary dis-
solution, none of the four key measures of entrepreneurial experience are significant.  In terms 
of bankruptcy, we again find no evidence to support H1b or H2b.  We also find that those 
with prior experience of failure and those with mixed experience are both more likely to be-
come bankrupt than novice entrepreneurs.  We reject H3b and H4b.  As with before, we also 
examine in Table 5, the influence that education, industrial experience and financial capital 
have on the relationship between venture outcomes and entrepreneurial experience.  In terms 
of bankruptcy, none of the interaction terms are significant.  Voluntary dissolution is, howev-
er, less likely amongst those with a degree/failure experience but more likely amongst finan-
cial capital/mixed entrepreneurial backgrounds. 
Table 5 about here 
                                                     
4 The significant negative effect of FEMALE and OPPORTUNITY on survival can only be observed amongst 
those with prior failure experience, but not within the group of founders with successful entrepreneurial experi-
ence (results are available on request from the authors). 
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In Table 6 we again restrict the samples to failed entrepreneurs and high-tech ventures.  
Model 1 shows previously failed necessity entrepreneurs more likely to face bankruptcy, 
whereas failed opportunity entrepreneurs are more likely to voluntarily dissolve their venture.  
In terms of high tech ventures (Model 2), there is evidence that failed entrepreneurs and those 
with mixed experience were more often likely to go bankrupt.  These results are similar to 
Table 5 for the total sample.   
Table 6 about here 
5 Discussion  
5.1. Key Findings 
This paper responds to the call by Ucbasaran et al (2013) to use large scale panel data 
to investigate if there are positive path dependencies between prior entrepreneurial experience 
and venture survival.  Essentially, the key advantage of prior experience is that the repetition 
of opportunity seeking activities reduces the costs of start-up, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of better survival outcomes (Plehn-Dujowich, 2010).  In contrast, the alternative argu-
ment is that learning either reflects underlying human capital abilities or is made more diffi-
cult to achieve by the idiosyncratic nature of opportunities (Frankish et al, 2012) and, as at-
tribution theory suggests, the difficulties that individuals have in correctly interpreting past 
instances of entrepreneurial failure and success.  One key advantage of our panel data is that 
we can control for a range of factors that are commonly associated with venture survival.  Of 
these, perhaps the most important are venture finance characteristics since prior research has 
indicated that prior experiences of bankruptcy can take years to clear (Cope, 2011) or, for 
successful entrepreneurs, provide them with access to resources (Gompers et al, 2010).   
Our key findings are that both portfolio and serial entrepreneurs are no more likely to 
survive in the new venture; nor were they more likely to avoid bankruptcy than novice entre-
preneurs.  Those with mixed experience are more likely than novice entrepreneurs to experi-
ence subsequent bankruptcy.  Previously failed entrepreneurs were found to be less likely to 
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survive and more likely to face bankruptcy.  There is little overall evidence to suggest that 
financial capital, industrial experience or education have an influential impact on the relation-
ship between venture outcomes and entrepreneurial experience.  In essence, our results indi-
cate a path dependency: if at first an entrepreneur fails, then the most likely outcome is bank-
ruptcy.  Within these overall findings, we also find interesting sub-sample results.  We find 
previously failed entrepreneurs who are motivated in the focal venture by opportunity are less 
likely to survive.  We also find that failed necessity motivated entrepreneurs are more likely 
to go bankrupt.   
Our results also show that venture finance characteristics are important indicators of the 
propensity of venture survival and bankruptcy outcomes.  In particular, ventures that experi-
ence financial problems and have fewer financial resources are less likely to experience effi-
cacious venture survival outcomes.  We also find that necessity entrepreneurs are less likely to 
survive and more likely to become bankrupt.  These results reiterate the importance of finan-
cial resources to survival outcomes and that necessity entrepreneurs are more likely to experi-
ence negative venture outcomes (Parker, 2009; Storey and Greene, 2010). 
 
5.2. Theoretical implications 
There has been considerable theoretical and empirical debate about the worth of entre-
preneurial experience to future venture outcomes.  Some theoretic pieces remain optimistic, 
arguing that prior entrepreneurial experiences can prepare entrepreneurs for future success in 
their new focal venture (Cope, 2011; McGrath, 1999) because such experiences provides a 
repertoire of skills and knowledge that allow experienced entrepreneurs to identify and exploit 
opportunities (Baron and Ensley, 2006).  Others are perhaps more equivocal, given that they 
recognize that whilst prior experience may provide assets it often brings with it liabilities 
which may prevent the full exploitation of these knowledge stocks (Holcomb et al, 2009).  
Hence, failed entrepreneurs may find it difficult to learn from their prior experiences (Shep-
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herd, 2003) perhaps because they are prone to particular cognitive biases (e.g. over-optimism) 
(Hayward et al, 2006), because it is difficult to apply prior experience to novel entrepreneurial 
situations (Frankish et al, 2012) or because they attribute failure to external situational factors 
rather than underlying issues in terms of effort or ability (Diwas et al, 2013).  A more pessi-
mistic view of experience, however, is that what actually matters more than experience is the 
underlying entrepreneurial talent of the entrepreneur to venture outcomes (Rocha et al, 2013; 
Chen, 2013).  
Within these competing theoretical stances, our results provide fresh insights into the 
role that prior entrepreneurial experience plays in venture survival.  One of the problems with 
the popular anecdotal view of the importance of prior entrepreneurial experience is that fail-
ure, in particular, is almost a ‘rites of passage’, representing “an essential pre-requisite for 
learning and adaptation” (Sitkin, 1992: 231).  Our findings do not support this view for any of 
the types of entrepreneurial experience we considered.  This, of course, does not imply that 
entrepreneurs do not learn, either from prior success or failure.  Nor would we want our re-
sults to imply that entrepreneurs do not attempt to apply their experiences – either positive or 
negative - in their new focal venture.  Instead, our results have three implications for under-
standing new venture activities.  
First, because market opportunities are idiosyncratic, there are limits to the applicability 
of a prior repertoire of experiences.  Our results, therefore, support prior evidence that has 
identified that it is difficult for experienced entrepreneur to apply what they learnt from past 
actions into new business situations (Frankish et al, 2012; Parker 2012).  In other words, en-
trepreneurial experience may provide assets but these assets are often unrealisable when faced 
with the endemic uncertainty of entrepreneurship.   
Second, rather than focusing on assets, our results stress the liabilities of entrepreneurial 
experience.  Wright, Robbie and Ennew (1997) suggested that relying on previously learnt 
behaviours and attitudes can be harmful since they can lead to costly errors.  Our findings - 
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particularly in terms of the sub-sample analyses of the motivational profiles of previously 
failed entrepreneurs - certainly chime with other evidence which reports that failed entrepre-
neurs can find it difficult to apply their experiences to their new focal firm.  Whilst our data 
only allow us to draw inferences, one candidate explanation is the importance of cognitive 
biases in entrepreneurial settings.  Although being over-optimistic is beneficial at start-up in 
propelling the venture forward, what our findings imply is that failed entrepreneurs can mis-
take tenacity for what is an unwarranted ‘escalation of commitment’ (Davidsson and Gordon, 
2012).  Entrepreneurs may also fall into competency traps (March, 1991) which stymies their 
ability to learn but may not inhibit their willingness to take excessive risks.  In sum, although 
we recognize that prior entrepreneurial experience can provide assets (Politis, 2005), such 
experiences do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes (Levinthal & March, 1993) and may 
“cause an entrepreneur to overlook or discard objective information, even when conditions of 
a class of events have changed” (Holcomb et al, 2009: 182).  This presents a challenge to en-
trepreneurship scholars.  Similar to the insights afforded by the grief literature on entrepre-
neurial failure (Shepherd, 2003), there is a need for a more careful understanding of the liabil-
ities of entrepreneurial experience and what impedes the efficacy of entrepreneurial experi-
ence.  Our sub-sample evidence begins to identify that there are different motivational profiles 
associated with those who are more likely to experience poorer venture survival outcomes but 
we call for further research that combines our focus on entrepreneurial outcomes with an ex-
amination of the pathways which may hinder or promote entrepreneurial learning. 
Finally, our results emphasize the importance of ability over experience.  We find that 
education rather than industrial experience or financial capital moderate the relationship be-
tween experience and survival outcomes.  Whilst we accept that cognitive and learning abili-
ties is heterogeneous (Schmidt and Hunter, 2004), we also concur with a view that sees learn-
ing being shaped more by underlying innate and deep-rooted socio-economic factors (Parker, 
2012) than transient performance outcomes.  Regardless of if entrepreneurs are liable to put 
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their prior (failure) success down to themselves or (bad) luck, our findings are more in step 
with a view that it is entrepreneurial ability rather than learning by doing gained by prior ex-
perience that explains venture survival and bankruptcy outcomes.  
 
5.3. Limitations 
Despite using large scale panel data, our study does have a number of limitations.  First, 
we know that institutional and cultural factors are influential in promoting or inhibiting par-
ticular attitudes to entrepreneurial failure.  Kirkwood (2007) identifies that countries such as 
New Zealand suffers from a ‘tall poppy’ syndrome (knocking of high achievers).  Hence, alt-
hough our results are in line with Frankish et al (2012) UK data and Parker (2012) who finds 
for the US that the value of entrepreneurial experience quickly decays, it may be that German 
entrepreneurs face particular cultural and institutional challenges that are absent elsewhere.  In 
particular, whilst failure is stigmatized in parts of the United States (Cardon, Stevens and Pot-
ter, 2011) a distinction is often drawn between European and United States in terms of ‘fear of 
failure’ (European Commission, 2010) whilst Klein and Helweg-Larsen (2002) identify that 
Americans are more prone to over-optimism.  We would, therefore, like to see comparative 
research that investigated international differences. 
Our study also only examines types of entrepreneurial experience rather than the nature 
of these entrepreneurial experiences (Westhead and Wright, 2011).  Hence, our data are silent 
on what impact different forms of learning (direct experience, vicarious or codified) have on 
these outcomes.  Moreover, although we show that necessity entrepreneurs are more likely to 
experience poorer survival outcomes, our data does not allow us to investigate the ambitions 
for the new venture.  Portfolio entrepreneurs, for example, may have been distracted by their 
other business commitments, limiting their ability to nurture the focal venture.  Similarly, 
whilst some previously failed entrepreneurs may be presumed to be financially conservative 
in the focal venture, it may be that such entrepreneurs adopt instead a high risk ‘double or 
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bust’ strategy.  As implied earlier, this suggests a need for a mixed method approach that lon-
gitudinally focuses on the outcomes of and learning processes used by experienced entrepre-
neurs.   
Understanding business closure/failure is hampered by the profusions of associated 
terms (e.g. discontinuance, death, closure, failure, exit, bankruptcy) (Watson and Everett, 
1996; Coad, 2013) and the fact that not all closures are, in fact, failures (Headd, 2003).  
Whilst this study has sought to examine two common dimensions of business closure/failure 
(voluntary dissolution and bankruptcy), there is a need to extend research that examines dif-
ferent subgroups of voluntary closure (Wennberg et al, 2010) and to more fully distinguish 
between those that previously either went bankrupt or chose voluntary dissolution.  In tandem 
with this, there is a further need to examine, using similar longitudinal data, the impact of 
prior experience on venture growth outcomes.  Survival may be the cardinal business objec-
tive but as scholars, policy makers and practitioners we are often keen to establish what fac-
tors are likely to promote venture performance.  This again needs to be done within a longitu-
dinal setting.  Similarly, because our data does not allow us to examine the profiles of each 
individual team member (whether as an owner or employee), we have focused on solo entre-
preneurs where we know their prior experience.  Future research could also further examine 
team entrepreneurship (Stam and Schutjens, 2005) and how differing entrepreneurial experi-
ences within the team influence venture performance.   
One final limitation of this study is that it suffers from a selection bias in that we do not 
have information in the KFW/ZEW Start-up Panel on formerly failed entrepreneurs who de-
cided not to re-enter entrepreneurship.  We cannot ignore the potential that our failed entre-
preneurs who, on average, fail again are drawn from a sub-sample of individuals who – rela-
tive to those that having failed realise that entrepreneurship is not for them – have either few 
alternative choices or are prone to cognitive biases.  This is an avenue for future research. 
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5.4. Implications for policy and practice 
For practitioners, our results raise important issues about entrepreneurial re-entry deci-
sions.  Our findings imply that successful entrepreneurs do not necessarily translate their ex-
periences successfully in to their new venture.  This calls on them to carefully evaluate any 
new opportunity and to challenge the routines that they have previously adopted.  One way of 
achieving this is to consider business planning activities which have been shown to improve 
decision making processes in entrepreneurial settings (Delmar and Shane, 2003).  These re-
sults may also encourage both successful and failed entrepreneurs to consider counterfactual 
thinking strategies.  We, therefore, join with Ucbasaran et al (2013) in urging failed entrepre-
neurs and other experienced entrepreneurs to consider how they make sense of their prior ex-
periences.  We know that cognitive biases are persistent features of entrepreneurial activity 
(Landier and Thesmar, 2009) and, as our results imply, they are less able if anything to recog-
nize their limitations than first-time entrepreneurs.  As such, prior entrepreneurs need to de-
velop heterophily rather than homophily by building businesses that rely on diverse teams and 
outside mentors.  This may aid the development of counter-factual thinking and allow entre-
preneurs to develop more realistic sense-making activities and stories about the financial 
health and well-being of their venture (Rosenzweig, 2007).   
As for policy makers, prior studies have provided competing interpretations of the value 
of relaxed bankruptcy laws.  Some studies show that that looser bankruptcy laws can promote 
entrepreneurial entry (Lee et al, 2007, 2011) whilst de Meza (2002) and de Meza and Southey 
(1996) argue that relaxed entry conditions encourage unsuited individuals into entrepreneur-
ship.  Our longitudinal evidence supports the latter interpretation of de Meza (2002).  We find 
that failure begets failure rather than breeds success.  We encourage policy makers to take 
note of these findings and consider the implications they have for their own bankruptcy laws.   
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6 Conclusions 
This study has investigated the path dependencies between four differing types of entre-
preneurial experience and venture survival outcomes.  Such a study is important because the 
ongoing theoretical and empirical debate about the efficacy of entrepreneurial experience.  
Our panel data study of 8,400 solo entrepreneurs uses a wide range of entrepreneurial, finan-
cial and venture level characteristics.  Using survival duration models, our results showed that 
venture survival outcomes are unrelated to prior successful entrepreneurial experience and 
that failed entrepreneurs are more likely to fail again.  These findings point to implications for 
scholars, entrepreneurs and policy makers and highlight the need for further research. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and T-Tests 
VARIABLE All Portfolio Serial  Failed Mixed Novice 
Dependent variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. 
Dev 
T-test sig. Mean Std. Dev T-test sig. Mean Std. Dev T-test sig. Mean Std. Dev T-test sig. Mean Std. Dev 
Survival 0.892 0.311 0.899 0.301  0.89 0.313  0.856 0.352 *** 0.872 0.336  0.896 0.305 
Bankruptcy 0.04 0.197 0.04 0.195  0.043 0.202  0.065 0.247 ** 0.083 0.277 ** 0.036 0.187 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 
PORTFOLIO 0.09 0.287               
SERIALS 0.059 0.235               
FAILURE 0.107 0.309               
MIX_EXP 0.013 0.113               
Entrepreneurial characteristics 
FEMALE 0.143 0.35 0.108 0.311 *** 0.089 0.286 *** 0.109 0.311 *** 0.083 0.277 ** 0.157 0.364 
DEGREE 0.306 0.461 0.47 0.499 *** 0.413 0.493 *** 0.344 0.475 *** 0.404 0.493 ** 0.27 0.444 
MASTERCRAFT 0.294 0.456 0.212 0.409 *** 0.22 0.414 *** 0.235 0.424 *** 0.165 0.373 ** 0.321 0.467 
AGE in years 40.897 9.846 43.352 9.069 *** 47.203 10.042 *** 43.557 9.613 *** 44.917 9.289 *** 39.627 9.617 
IND_EXP in years 15.461 9.68 15.444 10.295 * 19.467 11.113 *** 16.862 10.216 *** 16.138 9.618  14.925 9.298 
MANAGE_EXP 0.373 0.484 0.234 0.424 *** 0.309 0.463 *** 0.302 0.46 *** 0.248 0.434 ** 0.407 0.491 
OPPORTUNITY 0.27 0.444 0.421 0.494 *** 0.331 0.471 *** 0.269 0.444 * 0.459 0.501 *** 0.243 0.429 
NECESSITY 0.192 0.394 0.091 0.288 *** 0.126 0.332 *** 0.193 0.395  0.128 0.336 ** 0.211 0.408 
Venture characteristics                 
SIZE 3.369 5.585 4.09 5.546 *** 4.701 12.54 *** 3.01 4.466  3.75 4.059  3.219 4.775 
LTD 0.267 0.443 0.614 0.487 *** 0.465 0.499 *** 0.31 0.463 *** 0.541 0.501 *** 0.198 0.398 
R&D 0.176 0.381 0.299 0.458 *** 0.276 0.448 *** 0.222 0.416 *** 0.294 0.458 *** 0.144 0.351 
Financial controls                 
INV (€ thousands) 35.345 305.778 69.486 350.24 *** 101.377 1135.58 *** 25.379 78.76  35.862 79.063  27.265 87.723 
INV DUM 0.253 0.435 0.238 0.426  0.24 0.427  0.275 0.447  0.193 0.396  0.254 0.435 
RETAINED 65.742 41.031 63.88 41.686 * 62.947 42.368 ** 65.626 41.045  61.348 42.013  66.292 40.814 
EXTERNAL 12.586 27.658 10.709 25.528 ** 11.665 26.343  11.066 25.208 ** 17.183 32.215 ** 13.032 28.245 
PUBLIC 0.336 0.473 0.249 0.433 *** 0.226 0.418 *** 0.251 0.434 *** 0.275 0.449 ** 0.37 0.483 
FIN_PROBLEMS 0.156 0.363 0.181 0.385 ** 0.175 0.38 * 0.214 0.41 *** 0.266 0.444 *** 0.141 0.349 
Sector                 
CET 0.058 0.235 0.063 0.244  0.067 0.25  0.055 0.228  0.083 0.277  0.057 0.232 
HT 0.035 0.184 0.06 0.237 *** 0.047 0.211 ** 0.038 0.191  0.037 0.189  0.031 0.172 
NTB_SERVICES 0.197 0.398 0.197 0.398  0.27 0.445 *** 0.24 0.427 *** 0.239 0.428  0.184 0.387 
SOFTWARE 0.06 0.238 0.086 0.281 *** 0.081 0.274 ** 0.095 0.294 *** 0.101 0.303 ** 0.049 0.217 
OTHER_MANU 0.114 0.317 0.11 0.313  0.1 0.3  0.091 0.287 ** 0.083 0.277  0.119 0.324 
KNOW_SERVICES 0.055 0.229 0.065 0.246 * 0.081 0.274 ** 0.067 0.25 ** 0.11 0.314 ** 0.049 0.217 
OTHER_SERVICES 0.057 0.232 0.053 0.224  0.069 0.254  0.056 0.23  0.055 0.229  0.057 0.231 
35 
CONSUME_SERVICES 0.132 0.338 0.138 0.345  0.128 0.334  0.133 0.34  0.092 0.29  0.132 0.338 
CONSTRUCTION 0.129 0.335 0.085 0.279 *** 0.041 0.198 *** 0.096 0.295 *** 0.055 0.229 ** 0.147 0.354 
RETAIL 0.164 0.37 0.144 0.352 * 0.116 0.32 ** 0.129 0.335 ** 0.147 0.356  0.175 0.38 
Year of firm foundation                 
2005 0.133 0.339 0.089 0.284 *** 0.096 0.294 ** 0.157 0.364  0.083 0.277 * 0.138 0.345 
2006 0.163 0.369 0.112 0.316 *** 0.152 0.36  0.17 0.376  0.092 0.29 ** 0.17 0.376 
2007 0.18 0.384 0.198 0.399  0.177 0.382  0.169 0.375  0.101 0.303 ** 0.181 0.385 
2008 0.14 0.347 0.14 0.347  0.165 0.371  0.137 0.344  0.119 0.326  0.139 0.346 
2009 0.152 0.359 0.19 0.393 ** 0.15 0.358  0.143 0.351  0.229 0.422 ** 0.147 0.354 
2010 0.133 0.339 0.153 0.361 * 0.128 0.334  0.131 0.338  0.22 0.416 ** 0.129 0.335 
2011 0.1 0.3 0.116 0.321 * 0.132 0.339 ** 0.093 0.291  0.156 0.364 ** 0.096 0.294 
The values for the time-varying characteristics refer to the last reporting year.  
***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively and corresponds to the T-Test of the difference to the mean value of novice entrepreneurs being zero. 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1  SURVIVAL 1  
2  PORTFOLIO 0.008 1  
3  SERIAL -0.001 -0.079 1  
4  FAILURE -0.040 -0.109 -0.086 1  
5  MIX_EXP -0.007 -0.036 -0.029 -0.040 1  
6  FEMALE -0.015 -0.031 -0.038 -0.034 -0.020 1  
7  DEGREE -0.003 0.112 0.058 0.029 0.024 -0.043 1  
8  MASTERCRAFT 0.049 -0.057 -0.041 -0.045 -0.033 -0.072 -0.428 1  
9  AGE 0.004 0.079 0.160 0.093 0.047 0.019 0.192 -0.061 1  
10  IND_EXP 0.055 -0.001 0.103 0.050 0.008 -0.118 -0.031 0.170 0.564 1  
11  MANAGE_EXP 0.009 -0.090 -0.033 -0.050 -0.030 -0.057 0.090 0.063 0.105 0.147 1  
12  OPPORTUNIY -0.012 0.107 0.035 -0.001 0.049 0.003 0.103 -0.063 0.012 -0.078 0.022 1  
13  NECESSITY -0.031 -0.081 -0.042 0.000 -0.019 0.013 -0.076 0.018 0.131 0.089 -0.044 -0.296 1  
14  SIZE -0.014 0.041 0.060 -0.022 0.008 -0.021 0.047 0.020 0.051 0.057 0.109 0.058 -0.067 1 
15  LTD 0.027 0.247 0.112 0.033 0.071 -0.098 0.307 -0.138 0.182 0.048 0.068 0.178 -0.115 0.211 
16  R&D -0.023 0.102 0.066 0.041 0.035 -0.088 0.202 -0.096 0.047 0.004 0.047 0.185 -0.077 0.058 
17  INV (€ 000s) 0.003 0.035 0.054 -0.011 0.000 -0.017 0.025 -0.003 0.031 0.030 0.008 0.013 -0.024 0.272 
18  RETAINED 0.123 -0.014 -0.017 -0.001 -0.012 -0.061 0.027 0.027 0.089 0.143 0.044 -0.045 0.008 0.064 
19  EXTERNAL 0.009 -0.021 -0.008 -0.019 0.019 0.022 -0.036 0.045 -0.055 -0.043 0.027 0.024 -0.017 0.065 
20  PUBLIC -0.004 -0.059 -0.059 -0.063 -0.015 0.030 -0.052 0.072 -0.112 -0.067 0.046 -0.014 0.038 0.076 
21  FIN_PROBLEM -0.128 0.022 0.013 0.055 0.035 0.006 -0.014 -0.028 0.011 -0.029 -0.009 0.051 0.027 0.039 
22  SECTOR -0.022 -0.040 -0.068 -0.048 -0.027 0.149 -0.223 0.024 -0.103 -0.084 -0.070 -0.056 0.038 -0.004 
23  FOUND_YEAR 0.159 0.057 0.029 -0.020 0.048 0.016 0.020 -0.007 -0.046 -0.091 0.028 0.038 -0.007 -0.051 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
15  LTD 1 
16  R&D 0.281 1 
17  INV (€ 000s) 0.066 0.050 1 
18  RETAINED 0.010 -0.040 -0.032 1 
19  EXTERNAL -0.006 -0.013 0.056 -0.217 1 
20  PUBLIC -0.052 0.005 0.043 -0.184 0.231 1 
21  FIN_PROBLEM 0.048 0.063 0.009 -0.102 0.091 0.043 1 
22  SECTOR -0.223 -0.271 -0.011 -0.043 0.083 0.048 0.014 1 
23  FOUND_YEAR 0.162 0.010 0.017 0.031 0.137 0.219 0.013 0.006 
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Table 3 Effect of entrepreneurial experience on new venture survival: Discrete time duration 
model – random-effects complementary log-log model 
 
Model 1 (Base) Model 2 (Interaction terms) 
 Coeff.  Std. error Coeff. Std. error
Prior entrepreneurial experience 
PORTFOLIO -0.0154 (0.0445) -0.0831 (0.146) 
SERIALS -0.0206 (0.0520) -0.0133 (0.197) 
FAILURE -0.0969 *** (0.0364) -0.129 (0.138) 
MIX_EXP -0.173 (0.106) -0.310 (0.384) 
PORTFOLIO*DEGREE  -0.0102 (0.0853) 
SERIALS*DEGREE  0.0335 (0.102) 
FAILURE*DEGREE  0.165 **  (0.0773) 
MIX_EXP*DEGREE  0.192 (0.233) 
PORTFOLIO*IND_EXP  0.0613 (0.0461) 
SERIALS*IND_EXP  0.0287 (0.0597) 
FAILURE*IND_EXP  -0.0161 (0.0456) 
MIX_EXP*IND_EXP  0.104 (0.121) 
PORTFOLIO*INV  -0.00879 (0.00975) 
SERIALS*INV  -0.0121 (0.0113) 
FAILURE*INV  0.00325 (0.00811) 
MIX_EXP*INV  -0.0229 (0.0265) 
Entrepreneurial characteristics 
FEMALE -0.0176 (0.0346) -0.0175 (0.0346) 
DEGREE 0.0319 (0.0298) 0.00571 (0.0346) 
MASTERCRAFT 0.0956 *** (0.0300) 0.0979 ***  (0.0301) 
AGE 3.652 *** (1.100) 3.845 ***  (1.110) 
AGE2 -0.508 *** (0.150) -0.534 *** (0.152) 
IND_EXP 0.0803 *** (0.0167) 0.0700 ***  (0.0195) 
MANAGE_EXP -0.0258 (0.0253) -0.0242 (0.0255) 
OPPORTUNITY -0.0321 (0.0280) -0.0299 (0.0281) 
NECESSITY -0.0882 ***  (0.0309) -0.0888 (0.0310) 
Venture characteristics 
SIZE -0.0505 (0.0363) -0.0536 (0.0364) 
SIZE2 -0.0123 (0.0133) -0.0114 (0.0133) 
LTD 0.0509 (0.0320) 0.0540 *  (0.0321) 
R&D -0.0214 (0.0327) -0.0217 (0.0328) 
Financial controls 
INV 0.0353 ***  (0.0106) 0.0379 *** (0.0108) 
INV DUM 0.219 ** 0.102) 0.232 ** (0.102) 
RETAINED 0.00143 ***  
(0 000407
0.00143 *** (0.000408) 
EXTERNAL 0.000273 (0.000470
)
0.000273 (0.000472) 
PUBLIC 0.0521 (0.0272) 0.0501 * (0.0273) 
FIN_PROBLEMS -0.289 ***  (0.0296) -0.289 *** (0.0297) 
Other controls 
HT -0.237 *** (0.0817) -0.242 *** (0.0819) 
NTB_SERVICES -0.121 * (0.0619) -0.120 * (0.0621) 
SOFTWARE -0.195 *** (0.0728) -0.198 *** (0.0731) 
OTHER_MANU -0.155 ** (0.0646) -0.158 ** (0.0648) 
KNOW_SERVICES -0.148 ** (0.0736) -0.148 ** (0.0739) 
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Model 1 (Base) Model 2 (Interaction terms) 
 Coeff.  Std. error Coeff. Std. error
OTHER_SERVICES -0.248 *** (0.0736) -0.248 *** (0.0738) 
CONSUME_SERVICES -0.197 *** (0.0645) -0.203 *** (0.0647) 
CONSTRUCTION -0.170 *** (0.0649) -0.171 *** (0.0651) 
RETAIL -0.136 ** (0.0637) -0.141 ** (0.0639) 
Found. year 2006 -0.0548 (0.0365) -0.0550 (0.0366) 
Found. year 2007 -0.0313 (0.0370) -0.0332 (0.0371) 
Found. year 2008 0.00861 (0.0440) 0.00593 (0.0442) 
Found. year 2009 0.0169 (0.0489) 0.0135 (0.0491) 
Found. year 2010 0.1000 * (0.0597) 0.0971 (0.0600) 
Found. year 2011 0.215 ** (0.0856) 0.219 ** (0.0862) 
Reporting year 2007 -0.167 *** (0.0583) -0.171 *** (0.0585) 
Reporting year 2008 -0.173 *** (0.0439) -0.175 *** (0.0440) 
Reporting year 2009 -0.123 *** (0.0409) -0.124 *** (0.0410) 
Reporting year 2010 -0.0684 * (0.0397) -0.0674 * (0.0398) 
Constant -5.676 *** (2.004) -6.025 *** (2.021) 
Number of Observations 17,470 17,470
Number of firms 8,371 8,371 
WALD chi2(43) 374.33 ***  
WALD chi2(55)  383.18 ***
For Tables 3-6, ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively and correspond to the test of the 
underlying coefficient being zero. Reference categories, resp.: formal education: apprenticeship and minor formal education, 
motive for foundation: self-determination, industry sectors: NTB MANU (CET), foundations year: 2005, reporting year: 
2011. 
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Table 4 Effect of entrepreneurial experience on new venture survival: Discrete time duration 
model – random-effects complementary log-log model (restricted samples) 
 Restricted sample: Entre-
preneurial experi-
ence=FAILURE 
Restricted sample: High-
tech-Firms 
  Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error
Prior entrepreneurial experience 
PORTFOLIO 0.00821 (0.0739) 
SERIALS 0.0339 (0.0839) 
FAILURE -0.0811 (0.0596) 
MIX_EXP -0.215 (0.163) 
Entrepreneurial characteristics 
FEMALE -0.294** (0.116) -0.0237 (0.0785) 
DEGREE 0.115 (0.0879) -0.0218 (0.0504) 
MASTERCRAFT 0.0519 (0.0929) 0.0421 (0.0590) 
AGE 10.99*** (3.845) 6.168*** (1.830) 
AGE2 -1.491*** (0.516) -0.855*** (0.249) 
IND_EXP 0.0268 (0.0540) 0.116*** (0.0340) 
MANAGE_EXP -0.157** (0.0772) -0.0154 (0.0441) 
OPPORTUNITY -0.234*** (0.0837) -0.0854* (0.0476) 
NECESSITY -0.110 (0.0934) -0.0611 (0.0558) 
Venture characteristics 
SIZE 0.0116 (0.116) 0.0453 (0.0676) 
SIZE2 -0.0430 (0.0465) -0.0217 (0.0257) 
LTD 0.123 (0.0899) 0.0764 (0.0516) 
R&D -0.0562 (0.0923) 0.0117 (0.0473) 
Financial controls 
INV 0.0435 (0.0332) 0.00284 (0.0188) 
INV DUM 0.234 (0.318) -0.0616 (0.180) 
RETAINED 0.00172 (0.00127) 0.00157** (0.000714) 
EXTERNAL -0.000714 (0.00146) 1.45e-05 (0.000938) 
PUBLIC 0.0346 (0.0826) 0.0518 (0.0478) 
FIN_PROBLEMS -0.196** (0.0833) -0.272*** (0.0532) 
Other controls 
HT -0.336 (0.259) -0.250*** (0.0835) 
NTB_SERVICES -0.286 (0.185) -0.0907 (0.0659) 
SOFTWARE -0.428** (0.206) -0.179** (0.0780) 
OTHER_MANU -0.286 (0.200)  
KNOW_SERVICES 0.0203 (0.236)  
OTHER_SERVICES -0.325 (0.226)  
CONSUME_SERVICES -0.349* (0.196)  
CONSTRUCTION -0.483** (0.199)  
RETAIL -0.285 (0.199)  
Found. year 2006 0.0187 (0.109) -0.0408 (0.0612) 
Found. year 2007 -0.134 (0.110) -0.0110 (0.0633) 
Found. year 2008 0.00855 (0.127) 0.0968 (0.0760) 
Found. year 2009 -0.0425 (0.140) 0.0470 (0.0830) 
Found. year 2010 0.478** (0.206) 0.275** (0.107) 
Found. year 2011 0.135 (0.230) 0.326** (0.142) 
Reporting year 2007 -0.00142 (0.170) -0.110 (0.0999) 
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 Restricted sample: Entre-
preneurial experi-
ence=FAILURE 
Restricted sample: High-
tech-Firms 
  Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error
Reporting year 2008 -0.0537 (0.130) -0.0916 (0.0743) 
Reporting year 2009 -0.0981 (0.122) -0.0902 (0.0695) 
Reporting year 2010 -0.0709 (0.120) -0.0545 (0.0684) 
Constant -19.17*** (7.117) -10.15*** (3.346) 
Number of Observations 1,886  6,156 2,953 
Number of firms 893  2,953 
WALD chi2(35) 69.45***   
WALD chi2(37) 137.05***  
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Table 5 Competing risk model for interval censored data: Multinomial logistic model (Base 
outcome: Survival) 
 Model 1 (Base) Model 2 (Interaction terms) 
 Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
 failure event 1:  vol-
untary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
failure event 1:  vol-
untary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 
PORTFOLIO 0.0611 (0.169) 0.0599 (0.213) 0.0109 (0.515) 0.748 (0.625) 
SERIALS 0.0639 (0.194) 0.154 (0.244) 0.0204 (0.724) 0.279 (0.890) 
FAILURE 0.0719 (0.136) 0.628**
*
(0.159) -0.124 (0.477) 0.956* (0.546) 
MIX_EXP -0.0345 (0.465) 1.101**
*
(0.369) -7.105 (4.400) 2.038* (1.162) 
PORTFOLIO 
*DEGREE 
 -0.0672 (0.324) 0.159 (0.415) 
SERIALS*DEGREE  -0.398 (0.389) 0.281 (0.495) 
FAILURE*DEGREE  -0.598** (0.293) -0.118 (0.361) 
MIX_EXP*DEGREE  -1.152 (1.163) 0.397 (0.813) 
PORTFOLIO 
*IND_EXP 
 -0.113 (0.162) -0.265 (0.209) 
SERIALS*IND_EXP  0.00364 (0.222) -0.178 (0.266) 
FAILURE*IND_EXP  0.0812 (0.161) 0.0140 (0.189) 
MIX_EXP*IND_EXP  -0.305 (0.512) -0.370 (0.389) 
PORTFOLIO*INV  0.0445 (0.0377) -0.0205 (0.0421) 
PORTFOLIO*INV  0.0274 (0.0424) 0.0255 (0.0532) 
FAILURE*INV  0.0293 (0.0310) -0.0519 (0.0321) 
MIX_EXP*INV  0.841** (0.422) -0.0237 (0.0817) 
Entrepreneurial characteristics 
         
FEMALE -0.0360 (0.130) 0.201 (0.156) -0.0287 (0.130) 0.206 (0.157) 
DEGREE 0.0505 (0.108) - (0.150) 0.174 (0.124) -
0 373**
(0.187) 
MASTERCRAFT -0.302** (0.120) -0.203 (0.143) -0.302** (0.120) -0.220 (0.144) 
AGE -11.22*** (3.643) -8.414 (5.373) -11.67*** (3.671) -8.791 (5.440) 
AGE2 1.589*** (0.500) 1.131 (0.738) 1.647*** (0.504) 1.180 (0.747) 
IND_EXP -0.263*** (0.0596) - (0.0773) -0.253*** (0.0692) -0.138 (0.0948) 
MANAGE_EXP -0.0438 (0.0982) 0.263** (0.122) -0.0500 (0.0989) 0.256** (0.123) 
OPPORTUNITY 0.0613 (0.106) 0.141 (0.135) 0.0529 (0.106) 0.142 (0.136) 
NECESSITY 0.0963 (0.115) 0.559** (0.146) 0.0951 (0.115) 0.565**
*
(0.147) 
Venture characteristics 
SIZE 0.0338 (0.141) 0.533** (0.166) 0.0305 (0.141) 0.533**
*
(0.166) 
SIZE2 0.0179 (0.0550) -0.0434 (0.0517) 0.0201 (0.0555) -0.0421 (0.0519) 
LTD -0.543*** (0.134) 0.506** (0.145) -0.553*** (0.134) 0.505**
*
(0.146) 
R&D 0.0299 (0.121) 0.188 (0.155) 0.0329 (0.121) 0.189 (0.156) 
Financial controls 
INV -0.109*** (0.0400) -0.0860 (0.0524) -0.132*** (0.0412) -0.0787 (0.0537) 
INV DUM -0.742** (0.378) -0.422 (0.522) -0.853** (0.380) -0.453 (0.525) 
RETAINED - (0.00152 - (0.00191 -
0 00518**
(0.00152
)
-
0 00279
(0.00191
)EXTERNAL -0.00179 (0.00196 0.00055 (0.00207 -0.00182 (0.00196
)
0.00025
4
(0.00208
)PUBLIC -0.195* (0.104) -0.0951 (0.127) -0.183* (0.104) -0.0835 (0.128) 
FIN_PROBLEMS 0.450*** (0.111) 1.316** (0.117) 0.447*** (0.111) 1.313**
*
(0.118) 
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 Model 1 (Base) Model 2 (Interaction terms) 
 Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
 failure event 1:  vol-
untary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
failure event 1:  vol-
untary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
Other control terms 
HT 0.520 (0.344) 0.787** (0.375) 0.537 (0.345) 0.804** (0.377) 
NTB_SERVICES 0.440* (0.262) -0.0492 (0.352) 0.428 (0.262) -0.0458 (0.352) 
SOFTWARE 0.679** (0.290) 0.277 (0.403) 0.679** (0.290) 0.304 (0.405) 
OTHER_MANU 0.489* (0.276) 0.504 (0.336) 0.503* (0.276) 0.512 (0.337) 
KNOW_SERVICES 0.480 (0.298) 0.293 (0.408) 0.481 (0.299) 0.301 (0.409) 
OTHER_SERVICES 0.694** (0.298) 0.798** (0.367) 0.694** (0.298) 0.791** (0.367) 
CON-
SUME_SERVICES 
0.450 (0.274) 0.876**
*
(0.331) 0.453* (0.274) 0.891**
* 
(0.332) 
CONSTRUCTION 0.359 (0.280) 0.816** (0.337) 0.368 (0.281) 0.814** (0.338) 
RETAIL 0.313 (0.273) 0.650** (0.331) 0.319 (0.273) 0.668** (0.332) 
Found. year 2006 0.0170 (0.129) 0.406** (0.186) 0.0112 (0.129) 0.393** (0.186) 
Found. year 2007 0.0250 (0.132) 0.301 (0.190) 0.0215 (0.132) 0.297 (0.191) 
Found. year 2008 -0.113 (0.167) 0.0759 (0.229) -0.116 (0.168) 0.0685 (0.230) 
Found. year 2009 -0.186 (0.197) 0.203 (0.245) -0.187 (0.198) 0.190 (0.246) 
Found. year 2010 -0.404 (0.257) -0.272 (0.314) -0.404 (0.258) -0.286 (0.315) 
Found. year 2011 -1.588*** (0.543) -0.176 (0.432) -1.617*** (0.544) -0.188 (0.434) 
Report. year 2007 0.525** (0.226) 0.424 (0.283) 0.516** (0.226) 0.438 (0.283) 
Report. year 2008 0.604*** (0.178) 0.418* (0.223) 0.601*** (0.178) 0.432* (0.223) 
Report. year 2009 0.444*** (0.170) 0.271 (0.206) 0.442*** (0.170) 0.290 (0.206) 
Report. year 2010 0.190 (0.173) 0.294 (0.198) 0.187 (0.173) 0.299 (0.199) 
Constant 17.69*** (6.607) 10.75 (9.745) 18.69*** (6.653) 11.29 (9.854) 
Observations 17,470 17,470   
LR chi2 (86) 657.12***   
LR chi2 (110)  680.49***   
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Table 6 Competing risk model for interval censored data: Multinomial logistic model (Base 
outcome: Survival) (restricted samples) 
 Restricted sample: 
Entrepreneurial experi-
ence=FAILURE 
Restricted sample: 
High-tech-Firms 
 Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
 failure event 1: 
voluntary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
failure event 1: vol-
untary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 
PORTFOLIO  -0.211 (0.287) 0.335 (0.393) 
SERIALS  -0.227 (0.336) 0.210 (0.449) 
FAILURE  0.0788 (0.212) 0.661** (0.329) 
MIX_EXP  -0.854 (1.021) 1.651** (0.552) 
Entrepreneurial characteristics 
FEMALE 0.496 (0.391) 0.740* (0.401) -0.0783 (0.285) 0.413 (0.404) 
DEGREE -0.433 (0.319) -0.134 (0.386) 0.301* (0.179) -0.561* (0.290) 
MASTERCRAFT -0.352 (0.357) 0.216 (0.363) -0.0617 (0.223) -0.266 (0.338) 
AGE - (11.46) -21.29 (14.76) -18.39*** (5.470) -7.644 (11.75) 
AGE2 5.057* (1.535) 2.748 (2.009) 2.558*** (0.751) 1.139 (1.589) 
IND_EXP - (0.184) -0.0804 (0.229) -0.384*** (0.111) -0.198 (0.188) 
MANAGE_EXP 0.421 (0.281) 0.408 (0.307) -0.0775 (0.161) 0.353 (0.258) 
OPPORTUNITY 0.690* (0.286) 0.480 (0.349) 0.334** (0.170) - (0.271) 
NECESSITY -0.127 (0.367) 1.008** (0.364) 0.215 (0.196) -0.0100 (0.358) 
Venture characteristics 
SIZE -0.188 (0.396) 0.163 (0.444) -0.0969 (0.285) 0.0309 (0.350) 
SIZE2 0.133 (0.152) 0.0291 (0.160) -0.0438 (0.135) 0.0431 (0.114) 
LTD - (0.368) 0.509 (0.359) -0.448** (0.199) 0.512* (0.291) 
R&D - (0.336) 0.365 (0.376) -0.187 (0.172) 0.245 (0.265) 
Financial controls 
INV -0.126 (0.121) -0.103 (0.146) 0.0310 (0.0652) 0.0134 (0.113) 
INV DUM -1.128 (1.148) -0.0384 (1.439) 0.375 (0.617) 0.751 (1.139) 
RETAINED - (0.00425 -0.00151 (0.00505 - (0.00261 -0.00394 (0.00372
EXTERNAL - (0.00573 0.00379 (0.00523 -0.00459 (0.00398 0.00478 (0.00429
PUBLIC -0.161 (0.316) -0.0791 (0.330) -0.227 (0.178) 0.0556 (0.260) 
FIN_PROBLEMS - (0.322) 1.174** (0.298) 0.467** (0.193) 1.306** (0.250) 
Other controls 
HT -0.196 (1.206) 14.89 (680.8) 0.497 (0.351) 0.802** (0.385) 
NTB_SERVICES 0.593 (0.680) 14.08 (680.8) 0.348 (0.273) 0.0179 (0.370) 
SOFTWARE 1.196* (0.718) 14.14 (680.8) 0.585* (0.307) 0.384 (0.433) 
OTHER_MANU 0.384 (0.749) 14.30 (680.8)   
KNOW_SERVICES -0.556 (0.976) 13.60 (680.8)   
OTHER_SERVICES 0.561 (0.829) 14.37 (680.8)   
COSUME_SERVICES 0.680 (0.707) 14.74 (680.8)   
CONSTRUCTION 0.678 (0.766) 15.32 (680.8)   
RETAIL 0.502 (0.722) 14.49 (680.8)   
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 Restricted sample: 
Entrepreneurial experi-
ence=FAILURE 
Restricted sample: 
High-tech-Firms 
 Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
Coeff. Std. 
error 
 failure event 1: 
voluntary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
failure event 1: vol-
untary exit 
failure event 2: 
bankruptcy 
Found. year 2006 -0.183 (0.389) 0.0191 (0.450) -0.0419 (0.207) 0.512 (0.395) 
Found. year 2007 0.169 (0.390) 0.228 (0.448) -0.0226 (0.213) 0.276 (0.418) 
Found. year 2008 -0.140 (0.458) -0.445 (0.597) -0.303 (0.285) -0.371 (0.519) 
Found. year 2009 0.116 (0.502) -0.202 (0.587) -0.332 (0.321) 0.362 (0.503) 
Found. year 2010 -1.142 (0.831) -1.878* (1.125) -0.718* (0.432) -1.106 (0.741) 
Found. year 2011 -14.66 (804.9) 0.645 (0.885) -1.810** (0.786) -0.213 (0.826) 
Report. year 2007 -0.441 (0.609) 0.505 (0.702) 0.331 (0.366) 0.109 (0.577) 
Report. year 2008 0.323 (0.461) -0.252 (0.634) 0.269 (0.286) 0.368 (0.457) 
Report. year 2009 0.111 (0.445) 0.499 (0.516) 0.331 (0.270) 0.210 (0.428) 
Report. year 2010 - (0.450) 0.611 (0.516) -0.0848 (0.289) 0.639 (0.401) 
Constant 63.60* (21.24) 22.37 (681.3) 30.26*** (9.912) 7.083 (21.68) 
Observations 1,886 6,156   
LR chi2 (78) 145.61
***
  
LR chi2 (74)  264.79**
*
  
 
